Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial Prisoner's
  dilemma by Wu, Zhi-Xi & Rong, Zhihai
Boosting cooperation by involving extortion in spatial Prisoner’s dilemma
Zhi-Xi Wu1, ∗ and Zhihai Rong2, 3, †
1Institute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems,
Lanzhou University, Lanzhou Gansu 730000, China
2Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu Sichuan 611731, China
3Department of Electronic and Information Engineering,
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong
(Dated: Received: date / Revised version: date)
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner’s dilemma games with and without extor-
tion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy
updating manner (whether synchronous or asynchronous) and also the introduction of extortion
strategy affect the collective outcome of the games. By means of Monte Carlo (MC) simulations
as well as dynamical cluster techniques, we find that the involvement of extortioners facilitates the
boom of cooperators in the population (and whom can always dominate the population if the temp-
tation to defect is not too large) for both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating, in stark
contrast to the otherwise case, where cooperation is promoted for intermediate aspiration level with
synchronous strategy updating, but is remarkably inhibited if the strategy updating is implemented
asynchronously. We explain the results by configurational analysis and find that the presence of
extortion leads to the checkerboard-like ordering of cooperators and extortioners, which enable co-
operators to prevail in the population with both strategy updating manners. Moreover, extortion
itself is evolutionary stable, and therefore acts as the incubator for the evolution of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation means doing good for others incurring
a cost to oneself, which is indispensable for the orga-
nization and functioning of societies from insect to hu-
man [1]. Yet, the emergence and persistence of coopera-
tion is an evolutionary riddle as it defies the basic prin-
ciples of Darwinian evolution theory [2]: If cooperation
is costly to the individual and benefits only the interac-
tion partners, then Darwinian selection should favor non-
cooperating defectors and eliminate cooperation. Over
the past decades, the evolution of cooperation has at-
tracted considerable attention in scientific communities,
ranging from sociologists, biologists, mathematicians, to
physicists [3–14].
Perhaps, the most famous metaphor for cooperation
is the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, where two con-
fronting players can choose either to cooperate or to
defect. Mutual cooperation yields the reward R, mu-
tual defection leads to punishment P , and the conflict-
ing choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and
the defector the temptation T . The parameters satisfy
T > R > P > S so that without extra incentives to
support cooperation, the defector will always beat the
opponent [4]. Besides the well known five rules (kin se-
lection, direct and indirect reciprocity, spatial reciprocity,
and group selection) reviewed in [8] favoring the evolu-
tion of cooperation, recently discovered prominent mech-
anisms fostering cooperation are heterogeneous interac-
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tion structure [15], dynamical linking [16], distinct in-
teraction and learning graphs [17, 18], partner switch-
ing [19], diversity of impact weight and time scales [20–
23], dynamic payoff matrix [24], migration [25–27], in-
terdependent interaction network [28], and payoff shar-
ing [29], to name just a few. We refer to Refs. [8–12] for
brief overview on the state of the art.
Recently, Press and Dyson showed a novel class of
strategies via two-person repeated PD game, so-called
zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, which allow players to
enforce a linear relation unilaterally between one player’s
own payoff and the coplayer’s payoff [30]. Especially,
a subset of ZD strategies, extortion strategies, have at-
tracted considerable attention [30–35]. Since extortion-
ers can guarantee that one player’s own surplus exceeds
the coplayer’s surplus by a fixed percentage, extortion
is therefore able to dominate any evolutionary oppo-
nent [30]. In the realm of evolutionary games, however,
the success of strategies is determined not only by their
performance when confronting against other opponents,
but also by the performance when confronting against
themselves. Actually, in a homogeneous population of
extortioners, it is better to deviate by cooperating, since
any two extortioners hold each other down to surplus
zero, and extortion is therefore evolutionarily unstable
in well-mixed population [33, 34].
The evolutionary viability of extortion in structured
populations has been discussed recently by Szolnoki and
Perc [35, 36]. It was found that extortion is evolutionary
stable if the strategy updating is governed by a myopic
best response rule. The spirit of the myopic best re-
sponse rule is that if we are not happy or satisfied with
the benefit reaped by adopting the current strategy, we
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2may explore something else. In fact, myopic best re-
sponse rule is one of the heuristic strategies based on
stochastic learning theory [37]. Other classical examples
include tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift [1], reinforcement
learning [10], etc. Indeed, learning theory has provided
a powerful and reasonable framework to study the evolu-
tion of cooperation, since players can be viewed as adap-
tive agents, who are able to responding to and learning
from the ever-changing environment in perpetuity.
In this work, we continue the research line of [35] to
explore how the incorporation of extortion in the PD
affects the evolution of cooperation and the evolution-
ary viability of extortion as well in structured popula-
tions, but instead of the myopic best response rule, we
focus on games with aspiration-driven strategy updating
rule [38]. In Ref. [38], Chen and Wang studied the evo-
lution of cooperation in the context of weak PD (where
R = 1, T = b, and S = P = 0) with a stochastic learning
rule [37], where players update their strategies depend-
ing on the difference between the actual and aspiration
payoffs, and found that some certain moderate aspiration
level can lead to the optimal cooperation level.
We note that the strategy updating of the players is ex-
ecuted synchronously in their model. It has been pointed
out that whether the strategy updating is implemented
synchronously or asynchronously usually leads to large
disparities in the final evolutionary outcome [39]. We will
show below that the qualitative properties of the results
reported in [38] would change dramatically given that an
asynchronous strategy updating scheme is instead em-
ployed. In particular, intermediate aspirations will give
rise to lowest cooperation level. Unexpectedly, the qual-
itative disparities induced by different strategy updating
manners will go to disappear if extortion strategy is in-
troduced into the games, which highlights the positive
role of extortion in boosting and sustaining cooperation.
II. MODEL
Most actual populations are spatially structured in the
sense that individuals usually interact with those who
share close geographic proximity. To account for this fea-
ture, we consider evolutionary games in spatially struc-
tured population, where the players are located on the
sites of a square lattice with periodic boundary condi-
tions. Each player can take one of the three competing
strategies, namely extortion Eχ, cooperation C, and de-
fection D. Following closely with the previous work [34–
36], we will account for the popular form of the true
PD, i.e., the so called donation game, in which cooper-
ators provide a benefit b to their partners at a cost c to
themselves (b > c > 0), while defectors provide neither
benefits nor incur costs. With extortioners participating
in the game, the payoff matrix now reads as
Eχ C D
Eχ 0
(b2−c2)χ
bχ+c 0
C b
2−c2
bχ+c b− c −c
D 0 b 0
(1)
where χ determines the surplus of the extortioner in rela-
tion to the surplus of the other player [30–34]. Note that
with the absence of the extortion strategy, the donation
game is no other than a true PD game. The parameter b
determines the strength of the social dilemma, while the
parameter χ determines just how strongly the strategy
Eχ exploits cooperators. For simplicity, just as in [35],
we set χ = 1.5 and b−c = 1 so that there is only one free
parameter in the payoff matrix, i.e., the cost to cooperate
c. We have validated that our main conclusions presented
below are robust to other choice of large χ (e.g., χ = 5).
Initially, each player holds one of the three (or two,
if extortion is not incorporated into the game dynam-
ics) strategies with equal probability. The players col-
lect gains according to the payoff matrix (1) through
playing with their immediate neighbors. We consider
an aspiration-driven strategy updating to study the evo-
lution of strategies. During the evolutionary processes,
the players always try to explore other possible strate-
gies dependent on the difference between their current
payoff and the aspiration level, which can be understood
as the extent of satisfaction of the players with their en-
vironments (for instance, the aspiration level could be
regarded as the minimum living standard). Following
Chen and Wang [38], the aspiration level Pxa for one cer-
tain player x is defined as Pxa = kxA, where kx is the
number of neighbors of x and A the control parameter
(kx = 4 for the square lattice, and A is the same for all
the players). The value of A is typically constrained to
the interval [0, b− c]. Whenever updating his strategy, a
player x will move to another randomly selected possible
strategy with a probability
q =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Pxa)/κ] , (2)
where Px is the actual payoff yielded by x, and κ the
noise factor, which characterizes the irrationality or un-
certainty of the players in strategy transformation [40–
42]. Herein, κ is simply set to 0.1 to practically prohibit
a strategy change if the current strategy yields a higher
payoff than the aspiration level (we note that the quali-
tative features remain unchanged for different κ).
We account for two classical strategy updating schemes
for our model: one is the synchronous updating, and the
other is the asynchronous (or random sequential) one. In
the former case, in each MC time step all the players
get payoffs by playing with their neighbors and update
their strategies simultaneously according to Eq. (2), while
in the latter case the players are selected by chance to
change their strategies, and one MC time step consists
3of all the players having updated their strategies once
on average. Regardless of the applied strategy updat-
ing manner, we iterate the above elementary processes
for enough long time so that the average frequency of
strategies becomes time independent. In all simulations,
the stationary frequency of strategies are obtained by av-
eraging over the last 3000 generations of the entire 104
ones, and the data presented below are obtained by av-
eraging over 20 independent realizations. All our MC
simulations are carried out on a square lattice with size
N = 201× 201.
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Let us firstly present the simulation results of our
model entailing only strategies C and D. Regard-
less whether the strategy updating is performed syn-
chronously or asynchronously, for too small as well as
too large A, fC in the steady state will be around 0.5,
which are the expected trivial cases. For sufficiently small
A, all the players are satisfied with what they yield from
their neighbors through game interactions, and the sys-
tem is actually “frozen” in its initial state, whereas for
high enoughA, all the players will be always unhappy and
just switch their strategies blindly for ever (such “boiled”
system would naturally result in fC = 0.5). Thus, what
interests us most is the region where A is not too small,
and not too large as well. Hereafter, we will restrict our
main attention to the region 0 < A < b− c = 1.0.
The results summarized in Fig. 1(a)-(d) show clearly
that intermediate aspiration level can give rise to the en-
hancement of cooperation for both donation game and
weak PD game, provided that the strategy updating is
implemented in a synchronous way. Specifically, for not
too large b [e.g., b = 1.1 in Fig. 1(b)], the maximum
value of fC can even go up to 1, that is, cooperators
dominate totally the population. Nevertheless, we will
get the complete opposite scenario if the strategy up-
dating of the players is performed asynchronously. In
particular, we observe that some moderate aspirations
result in the lowest cooperation level, and the value of
fC of is always smaller than 0.5 in the whole aspiration
region. Rather than as a promoter of cooperation in the
case of synchronous strategy updating, medium aspira-
tions now behave as an inhibitor for the formation and
maintenance of cooperation. The generalized mean filed
approximation method based on five-site cluster [42–44]
predicts correctly the evolutionary trend of cooperation
for the asynchronous strategy updating case (Figure 1
shows explicitly that the estimations obtained via five-
site cluster dynamical mean-field approximations match
more and more accurate with the simulation results as A
increases, especially for large b). It is worthy pointing out
that the dynamical cluster approximation is based on the
assumption of continuous time, and hence on the asyn-
chronous (random sequential) strategy updating [10].
The discrepancy induced by the different strategy up-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Stationary frequency of cooperation
fC as a function of the average aspiration level A for different
values of the temptation to defect b. (a) is for the weak PD
case with R = 1, T = b, and S = P = 0; (b)-(d) are for the
true PD case with R = b− c = 1, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0.
The solid squares and open circles correspond, respectively,
to the results obtained by carrying out synchronous and asyn-
chronous strategy updating, and the continuous lines repre-
sent the predictions of the five-site [as shown in panel (d)]
dynamical cluster approximation [42–44].
dating manners can be understood intuitively as follows.
We know that in the context of donation game, mutual
cooperation distributes benefits to each others, while mu-
tual defection does not. Thus, the clusters composed of
cooperators will be much more stable than those of defec-
tors as long as A < b−c = 1.0. In the case of synchronous
strategy updating, those clustered, unsatisfied defectors
may change to cooperators simultaneously. After that,
the clustered cooperators become happy and stable since
they benefit each other. As such, the synchronous strat-
egy updating manner could facilitate the formation of
large clusters of cooperators for moderate aspiration lev-
els, hence promoting cooperation. In contrast, if the
players update their strategies asynchronously, the clus-
ters of defectors (if formed) are stable and there is little
incentives for inner defectors to change to cooperation,
and occasional strategy flippings will be restored rapidly,
since any tentative transformation to cooperators just
means that they would be exploited more severely by the
defective neighbors in the future. As a result, medium as-
pirations just deteriorate the circumstance to incubating
cooperation.
The above disagreement between the results yielded by
synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating simu-
lates us to investigate whether the involvement of extor-
tioners in the donation game would affect the final evolu-
tionary outcome. In what follows, we report our results
for the three-strategy competing game model. In Fig. 2,
the stationary frequencies of the three strategies, fE , fC ,
and fD, are plotted as a function of A for four special
values of b. Remarkably, we see that the introduction
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Stationary frequencies of extortion
fE (squares), cooperation fC (circles), and defection fD (tri-
angles) as a function of the average aspiration level A for
different values of the temptation to defect b. Here we have
selected χ = 1.5 to define the extortion strategy Eχ. Other
parameters are R = b − c = 1, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0.
Solid and hollow symbols correspond, respectively, to the re-
sults obtained by carrying out synchronous and asynchronous
strategy updating. The lines are guides to the eyes.
of extortion can help cooperators to establish and even
dominate in the population for appropriate intermediate
aspiration level A. Contrary to the case of two-strategy
donation game, now both the synchronous and asyn-
chronous strategy updating result in the qualitatively
same results: cooperation is boosted in a resonance-like
behavior for intermediate aspiration level A, despite of
the fact that the introduction of extortioners increases
the chance of cooperators being exploited. Moreover, ex-
tortion itself becomes evolutionary stable in the whole
range 0 < A < b−c = 1 for all the considered values of b.
Particularly, in the region where cooperation is promoted
(that is, fC in the stationary state is greater its initial
value 1/3), extortion always outperforms defection.
Note that for not large values of b [b = 1.1 and 1.2 in
Figs. 2(a) and (b)], the average fraction of cooperators in
the stationary state is always greater than those of extor-
tioners and defectors. Even for sufficiently large b = 1.6
and 1.9, cooperators are the majority in the population
as long as A ≤ 0.5 and A ≤ 0.3 [Figs. 2(c) and (d)]. Pe-
culiarly, for moderate aspiration levels, the presence of
extortion can even drive the defectors to extinction [see
Fig. 2(a)-(c)]. Hence, unlike the work by Szolnoki and
Perc [35], where the same three-strategy game model is
studied by adopting myopic best response rule and the
existence of extortioners is proven to just provide an evo-
lutionary escape hatch for cooperator to survive, in our
current model extortion behaves as the incubator and
promotor for the emergence and persistence of coopera-
tion.
For the asynchronous strategy updating case, we are
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FIG. 3. Stationary frequencies of extortion fE , cooperation
fC , and defection fD as a function of the average aspiration
level A for different values of the temptation to defect b. The
symbols are exactly the same as shown in Fig. 2 for the case
of asynchronous strategy updating, and the solid lines illus-
trate the results predicted by the five-site dynamical cluster
approximation [42–44].
FIG. 4. (Color online) Typical spatial distributions of extor-
tioners (light gray), cooperators [blue (dark gray)], and defec-
tors [red (medium gray)], as obtained for the three-strategy
competing model with A = 0.3 and c = 0.6 on the square lat-
tice by means of aspiration-driven strategy updating. (a) is
for synchronous strategy updating, and (b) for asynchronous
strategy updating rule. Other parameters are the same as in
Fig. 2.
also able to estimate the average frequencies of the three
strategies by using of the generalized mean-field approx-
imation method [42–44]. Once again, the predictions of
the five-site cluster approximation shown in Fig. 3 are
in good consistent with the MC simulation results, espe-
cially for large values of A.
To explain these unexpectedly results, we monitor
the typical stationary distribution of strategies for the
parameter combination A=0.3 and b=1+c=1.6, under
which condition the average frequencies of extortion, co-
operation, and defection satisfy the relationship fC >
fE > fD. The pictures displayed in Figs. 4(a) and (b)
correspond, respectively, to the cases where the strategy
5updating is executed synchronously and asynchronously.
At a first glance, we observe that cooperators and extor-
tioners self-organize into checkerboard-like configuration,
just like what has been found in [35] where the game dy-
namics is driven by the myopic best response rule. This is
somewhat expected since Eχ and C form the snowdrift-
like relation [34–36].
In order to get a deep insight on how the system evolves
to checkerboard-like patterns, let us consider the case
b=1+c=1.2 [Fig. 3(b)]. When A ≈ 0, the C players with
many D neighbors are unhappy with what they get and
would transform to either D or Eχ, which will increase
the abundance of D-Eχ and Eχ-Eχ pairs in the system.
After that, the Eχ (D) players with neighbors compris-
ing only E and/or D begin to get unsatisfied since they
get nothing from each others. Driven by the rule of (2),
in the sea of defectors, D will drift to Eχ, and once the
sea of extortioners is formed by chance, C gets the great
chance to strike back and flourish (since a cooperator
confronting extortioners will get more than extortioners
confronting themselves). Because C and Eχ are able to
support each other due to their snowdrift-like relation,
the C-Eχ pair is fairly stable than the D-Eχ and Eχ-Eχ
pairs. Consequently, the equilibrium fC will be greater
than fE and fD. With increasing A, those D players
with just one C neighbor also begin to becoming un-
satisfied. Moreover, the C-C pairs are more likely to
evolve to C-Eχ pairs. Taken together, as long as A does
not go to too large (where no players are happy with
what they get and all the three strategies switch ran-
domly), the abundance of C-Eχ pair in the system will
grow steadily, while D-D, D-Eχ, and Eχ-Eχ decrease
stably. The running off of Eχ induced by the pairs Eχ-
Eχ changing to C-Eχ could be compensated by the pairs
D-Eχ changing to Eχ-Eχ, such that the fE is nearly un-
changed. The ultimate result is that fC (fD) will grow
(decline) with increasing A, and cooperators and extor-
tioners self-organize into checkerboard-like pattern, sim-
ilar to those shown in Fig. 4. As A goes to sufficiently
large, say A > b − c = 1, the average frequencies of the
three strategies converge definitely to the same value 1/3.
We notice that for sufficiently high b, say b = 1.6 and
1.9, defectors will become the majority in the population
and the equilibrium fD will be greater than fE and fC ,
if the aspiration level goes beyond a certain critical value
[see Figs. 2 and 3]. The main reason may come from the
fact that for large enough A, the C players surrounded by
two (or even one) D neighbors are becoming unsatisfied
(remind that large b also means large cost c, since we have
fixed b − c = 1), and they are more likely to transfer to
defection, whereas the D players would be happy if they
had only one neighbor of C. The heavy exploitation on
cooperators by D restrains the further growth of C.
So far we have witnessed that introducing extortioners
into the original donation game will lead to the most
possible strategy configuration in the stationary state
that all the three strategies are scattered among each
others (Fig. 4). Actually, the essential reason for this
emergent phenomenon is due to the fact that the strate-
gies Eχ and D are neutral and the strategies Eχ and
C are of snowdrift-like relation in terms of (1), both of
which support the scattering of strategies and prevent
the clustering of them. The emergent scattering pat-
tern of strategies can efficiently avoid the players to flip
collectively their strategies when the strategy updating
is implemented synchronously, in contrast to the case
of two-strategy donation game (Fig. 1). Accordingly,
both synchronous and asynchronous strategy updating
schemes give rise to the qualitatively similar results for
the studied three-strategy competing game model, de-
spite of some slight quantitative differences.
Finally, it is worthy pointing out that the
checkerboard-like configuration composed of Eχ and C,
once formed, can efficiently restrain the growth of D for
small and intermediate A in the framework of aspiration-
driven strategy evolution (2), since cooperators are well
surrounded by extortioners, whom themselves can
obtain positive profits when confronting C, much better
than getting nothing when confronting D. As such,
by reasonable aspirations, defectors can even be driven
out in the population [Figs. 2(a)-(c)]. Contrarily, the
checkerboard-like ordering of Eχ and C can be easily
destroyed by defectors provided myopic best response
rule is used for strategy updating, since their presence
in place of an extortioner may yield a higher payoff
in a predominantly cooperative neighborhood. Thus,
unlike the three-strategy competing game driven by
myopic best response rule, where extortion serves as
“the Trojan Horse” and helps cooperators to grab a hold
among defectors [35], extortion plays the role of “the
Aegis” to impede the invasion of defection, supports the
growth and guarantees the flourish of cooperators in our
aspiration-driven game model.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
To summarize, we have studied spatial evolutionary
Prisoner’s dilemma game with and without extortion by
adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. Us-
ing both Monte Carlo simulations and the generalized
mean-field approximations we have determined how the
fraction of cooperation depends on the presence of extor-
tion strategy and on the scheme of strategy updating. In
games entailing only two strategies C and D, we find that
asynchronous strategy updating manner always inhibits
the evolution of cooperation, in stark contrast to the case
of synchronous updating, where cooperation is promoted
in a way resembling a coherence-resonance-like behavior.
Remarkably, introducing extortioners into the population
will wipe off the difference induced by different strategy
updating manners, and cooperation is always enhanced
for small and moderate aspiration levels. For appropri-
ate parameters, defectors can even be eliminated com-
pletely in the population [Figs. 2(a)-(c)]. Despite of the
success of cooperators, another noteworthy property is
6that extortion itself is always evolutionary stable in our
proposed game model with aspiration-driven strategy up-
dating rule. Just like the (myopic) best response rule, the
stochastic learning rule based on individual aspiration (2)
is arguably an integral part of human behavior [45], our
presented results therefore may help us to understand, in
addition to the evolution of cooperation, the evolution of
extortion in our human society.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (Grant No. 11135001), and by
the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Univer-
sities (Grant No. lzujbky-2014-28).
[1] M. A. Nowak, Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the
Equations of Life (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 2006).
[2] K. Sigmund, The calculus of selfishness (Princeten Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ, 2010).
[3] R. Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton, The evolution of coop-
eration, Science 211, 1390 (1981).
[4] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, revised ed.
(Basic Books, New York, 2006).
[5] J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England,
1982).
[6] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games
and Population Dynamics (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1998).
[7] M. Doebeli and C. Hauert, Models of cooperation based
on prisoner’s dilemma and snowdrift game, Ecol. Lett. 8,
748 (2005).
[8] M. A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation,
Science 314, 1560 (2006).
[9] D. A. Rand and M. A. Nowak, Human cooperation,
Trends Cognitive Sci. 17, 413 (2013).
[10] G. Szabo´ and G. Fath, Evolutionary games on graphs,
Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007).
[11] C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, and A. Sa´nchez, Evolutionary
game theory: temporal and spatial effects beyond repli-
cator dynamics, Phys. Life. Rev. 6, 208 (2009).
[12] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, Coevolutionary games—A mini
review, Biosystems 99, 109 (2010).
[13] H. Ohtsuki, C. Hauert, E. Lieberman, and M. A. Nowak,
A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs
and social networks, Nature 441, 502 (2006).
[14] J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, M. Campillo, L. M. Flor´ıa, and
Y. Moreno, Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in
Complex Topologies, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 108103 (2007).
[15] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Scal-free networks pro-
vide a unifying framework for the emergence of coopera-
tion, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098401 (2005).
[16] J. M. Pacheco, A. Traulsen, and M. A. Nowak, Coevolu-
tion of Strategy and Structure in Complex Networks with
Dynamical Linking, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 258103 (2006).
[17] H. Ohtsuki, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco, Breaking
the Symmetry between Interaction and Replacement in
Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98,
108106 (2007).
[18] Z.-X. Wu and Y.-H. Wang, Cooperation enhanced by
the difference between interaction and learning neighbor-
hoods for evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma games,
Phys. Rev. E 75, 041114 (2007).
[19] F. Fu, T. Wu, and L. Wang, Partner switching stabilizes
cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma, Phys.
Rev. E 79, 036101 (2009).
[20] H.-X. Yang, W.-X. Wang, Z.-X. Wu, Y.-C. Lai, and B.-
H. Wang, Diversity-optimized cooperation on complex
networks, Phys. Rev. E 79, 056107 (2009).
[21] Z.-X. Wu, Z. Rong, and P. Holme, Diversity of reproduc-
tion time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s
dilemma games, Phys. Rev. E 80, 036106 (2009).
[22] Z. Rong, Z.-X. Wu, and W.-X. Wang, Emergence of coop-
eration through coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner’s
dilemma, Phys. Rev. E 82, 026101 (2010).
[23] Z. Rong, Z.-X. Wu, and G. Chen, Coevolution of
strategy-selection time scale and cooperation in spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game, EPL 102, 68005 (2013).
[24] S. Lee, P. Holme, and Z.-X. Wu, Emergent Hierarchi-
cal Structures in Multiadaptive Games, Phys. Rev. Lett.
106, 028702 (2011); Cooperation, structure, and hierar-
chy in multiadaptive games, Phys. Rev. E 84, 061148
(2011).
[25] C. P. Roca and D. Helbing, Emergence of social cohesion
in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals, Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108, 11370 (2011).
[26] H.-X. Yang, Z.-X. Wu, and B.-H. Wang, Role of
aspiration-induced migration in cooperation, Phys. Rev.
E 81, 065101(R) (2010)
[27] X. Chen, A. Szolnoki, and M. Perc, Risk-driven migra-
tion and the collective-risk social dilemma, Phys. Rev. E
86, 036101 (2012).
[28] Z. Wang, A. Szolnoki, and M. Perc, Optimal interdepen-
dence between networks for the evolution of cooperation,
Sci. Rep. 3, 2470 (2013).
[29] Z.-X. Wu and H.-X. Yang, Social dilemma alleviated by
sharing the gains with immediate neighbors, Phys. Rev.
E 89, 012109 (2014).
[30] W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson, Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolu-
tionary opponent, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109, 10409
(2012).
[31] A. J. Stewart and J. B. Plotkin, Extortion and cooper-
ation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 109, 10134 (2012).
[32] A. J. Stewart and J. B. Plotkin, From extortion to gen-
erosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110, 15348 (2013).
[33] C. Adami and A. Hintze, Evolutionary instability of zero-
determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not
everything, Nat. Commun. 4, 2193 (2013).
[34] C. Hilbe, M. A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund, Evolution of
extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games, Proc.
7Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 110, 6913 (2013).
[35] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Evolution of extortion in struc-
tured populations, Phys. Rev. E 89, 022804 (2014).
[36] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Defection and extortion as un-
expected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in struc-
tured populations, Sci. Rep. 4 5496 (2014).
[37] M. W. Macy and A. flache, Learning dynamics in social
dilemmas, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 99, 7229 (2002).
[38] X. Chen and L. Wang, Cooperation enhanced by moder-
ate tolerance ranges in myopically selective interactions,
Phys. Rev. E 80, 046109 (2009).
[39] B. A. Hubermann and N. S. Glance, Evolutionary games
and computer simulations, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
90, 7716 (1993).
[40] L. E. Blume, The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic In-
teraction, Games and Economic Behavior 5, 387 (1993).
[41] A. Traulsen, J. M. Pacheco, and M. A. Nowak, Pair-
wise comparison and selection temperature in evolution-
ary game dynamics, J. Theor. Biol. 246 522 (2007).
[42] G. Szabo´ and C. To˝ke, Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game on a square lattice, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998).
[43] J. Vukov, G. Szabo´, and A. Szolnoki, Cooperation in the
noisy case: Prisoners dilemma game on two types of reg-
ular random graphs, Phys. Rev. E 73, 067103 (2006).
[44] G. Szabo´, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki, Phase diagrams
for an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on two-
dimensional lattices, Phys. Rev. E 72, 047107 (2005).
[45] A. Traulsen, D. Semmann, R. D. Sommerfeld, H.-J.
Krambeck, and M. Milinski, Human strategy updating
in evolutionary games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 107,
2962 (2010).
